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COMMON THEMES AND UNINTENDED 
CONSEQUENCES IN CLASS ACTION REFORM 
FRANCIS E. MCGOVERN* 
The reform pendulum has been swinging in the direction of limiting the 
scope and flexibility of the class action procedural device. The Private 
Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA),1 the Securities Litigation 
Uniform Standards Act (SLUSA),2 the Class Action Fairness Act 
(CAFA),3 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 (Rule 23),4 various state 
statutes and rules,5 and a variety of state6 and U.S. Supreme Court 
decisions7 have included significant efforts to make class actions look 
more like traditional one-on-one litigation. These efforts have focused on 
five overlapping areas: public transparency, client control and attorney 
selection, attorney fees, suit selection, and an increased judicial role. At 
the same time, however, these reforms have generated unintended 
consequences that have the potential for creating new problems or 
undercutting the efficacy of the reforms themselves. 
REFORM THEMES 
The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, the Securities Litigation 
Uniform Standards Act, the Class Action Fairness Act, recent amendments 
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, and recent U.S. Supreme Court 
decisions share a number of consistent themes. These reforms are designed 
to curb perceived abuses in Rule 23 practice by requiring class action 
cases to conform generally to a model more closely akin to traditional 
litigation. The explicit goal of the PSLRA and SLUSA is to place 
limitations on the excesses of securities litigation. The findings in CAFA 
 * Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law. There were many helpful comments from 
judges, practitioners, and academics that have been incorporated in this brief paper. In particular, 
Judge Lee Rosenthal, Professor Jim Cox, Professor Tom Rowe, Elizabeth Cabraser and Gretchen 
Bellamy were most helpful with their kindness and assistance. In addition, appreciation is due to the 
editors of this law review for their assistance. 
 1. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u et seq. 
 2. Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, 15 U.S.C.A. §§77p(a)-(f). 
 3. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 118 Stat. 4 (to be codified at 28 
U.S.C.A. §§ 1711–1715).  
 4. FED. R. CIV. P. 23. 
 5. See, e.g., ALA. CODE, §§ 6-5-640 to 642 (LexisNexis Supp. 2004), AL. R. CIV. P. 23. 
 6. See, e.g., Sw. Ref. Co. v. Bernal, 22 S.W. 3d 425 (Tex. 2000). 
 7. See, e.g., Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999); Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 
521 U.S. 591 (1997). 
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focus on a variety of abuses of the class action device, specifically in the 
areas of excessive attorney fees, inadequate recoveries, and conflicting or 
unfair outcomes in state courts. Recent amendments to Rule 23 have been 
directed toward the undemocratic empowerment of lead counsel, problems 
in the award of attorney fees, and difficulties in coping with objections. 
The latest U.S. Supreme Court cases have addressed the adequacy of 
representation, the fungibility of class members, and the appropriate role 
for the federal judiciary. The following list of five common themes and 
several illustrations of each theme suggests the overlapping approaches 
taken by these reform efforts. 
1. Public Transparency. One of the more important themes in class 
action reform has been to increase the light of day in proceedings. Rule 
23(e)(4)(A) provides that “[a]ny class member may object to a proposed 
settlement, voluntary dismissal, or compromise that requires court 
approval. . . .”8 Once an objection is lodged, however, it “may be 
withdrawn only with the court’s approval.”9 Apparently some class action 
lawyers decided to pay a premium to objectors rather than fight objections 
through the normal legal process. The rule change prevents such 
agreements unless the court approves. 
The Class Action Fairness Act contains provisions requiring defendants 
who are proposing the settlement of a class action to notify appropriate 
federal or state officials of the complaint, fairness hearing, notice to class 
members, proposed settlement agreements with class counsel, and other 
relevant information about the proposed resolution.10 The concept is that 
public officials who may have some interest in protecting the interests of 
the public would be able to deter unwise settlements. Alabama requires “a 
full evidentiary hearing on class certification” to avoid “drive-by” 
certifications.11 
2. Client Control and Attorney Selection. One major concern about the 
use of the class action device has been the control exercised by lead 
counsel without adequate governance by the clients. The 2003 
amendments to Rule 23 address this issue by separating the Rule 23(a)(4) 
consideration of adequacy of representation from the Rule 23(g) selection 
of lead counsel.12 Rule 23(g) also lists a variety of specific factors that 
 8. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(4)(A). 
 9. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(4)(B). 
 10. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA), 28 U.S.C.A. § 1715 (“Notifications to 
appropriate federal and state officials.”). 
 11. ALA. CODE § 6-5-641(d) (LexisNexis Supp. 2004). 
 12. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g). 
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courts “must consider” in appointing class counsel.13 The 2003 
amendments to the Texas class action rule mirror the federal rule.14 The 
Texas Rules of Civil Procedure also provide that the “court may order the 
naming of additional parties in order to insure the adequacy of 
representation.”15 
The PSLRA and SLUSA go even further for courts to focus on the most 
adequate plaintiff and to select lead counsel based upon their representation 
of the party with the most significant financial interest.16 
Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor and Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp. 
address in some detail the necessity for class counsel not to have any 
conflict in connection with their representation.17 If counsel is to represent 
a class, the class must be sufficiently homogenous that there are no class 
members who are disadvantaged because of minority interests that they 
might possess.18 
 13. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g):  
 (g) Class Counsel. 
 (1) Appointing Class Counsel. 
 (A) Unless a statute provides otherwise, a court that certifies a class must appoint class 
counsel. 
 (B) An attorney appointed to serve as class counsel must fairly and adequately represent 
the interests of the class. 
 (C) In appointing class counsel, the court (i) must consider: the work counsel has done in 
identifying or investigating potential claims in the action, counsel’s experience in handling 
class actions, other complex litigation, and claims of the type asserted in the action,counsel’s 
knowledge of the applicable law, and the resources counsel will commit to representing the 
class; 
 (ii) may consider any other matter pertinent to counsel’s ability to fairly and adequately 
represent the interests of the class; 
 (iii) may direct potential class counsel to provide information on any subject pertinent to 
the appointment and to propose terms for attorney fees and nontaxable costs; and 
 (iv) may make further orders in connection with the appointment. 
 (2) Appointment Procedure 
 (A) The court may designate interim counsel to act on behalf of the putative class before 
determining whether to certify the action as a class action. 
 (B) When there is one applicant for appointment as class counsel, the court may appoint 
that applicant only if the applicant is adequate under Rule 23(g)(1)(B) and (C). If more than 
one adequate applicant seeks appointment as class counsel, the court must appoint the 
applicant best able to represent the interests of the class. 
 (C) The order appointing class counsel may include provisions about the award of 
attorney fees or nontaxable costs under Rule 23(h). 
 14. TEX. R. CIV. P. 42(g). 
 15. TEX. R. CIV. P. 42(c)(1)(c). 
 16. 15 U.S.C. § 77z-1(a)(3)(B)(iii)(I)(bb); 15 U.S.C. §§77p(b)-(c). 
 17. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 625 (1997); Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 
U.S. 815, 852 (1999). 
 18. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 627; Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 854. 
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3. Attorney Fees. Probably the most fervently expressed criticisms of 
class actions have been directed at the compensation of class counsel. 
CAFA addresses the attorney fee issue in several directions. It limits 
contingent fees in “coupon settlements” to the coupons that are actually 
redeemed rather than the total coupons offered to class members. In non-
contingent fee coupon settlements, the court shall approve the amount of 
attorney fees.19 
Rule 23(h) directs the court to consider attorney fees by motion in 
accordance with Rule 54(d)(2), to hold a hearing, and to make findings of 
fact and conclusions of law under Rule 52(a).20 Texas, for example, 
amended its class action rule in 2003 to require an hourly rate calculation 
approach to the determination of attorney fees and a limitation on the 
lodestar range.21 
4. Suit Selection. Reform efforts address suit selection by plaintiffs’ 
attorneys in several ways. The PSLRA requires counsel to meet a 
threshold evidentiary requirement before being allowed to commence 
formal pre-trial discovery.22 
Rule 23(c) provides that “the court must—at an early practicable 
time—determine by order whether to certify the action as a class action.”23 
“Conditional” certification has been deleted.24 There is also the 
opportunity to seek an appeal of a class certification decision to a court of 
appeals.25 
 19. 28 U.S.C. § 1712(a)-(e) discusses attorney fees in the context of coupon settlements. 
 20. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(h). 
 21. TEX. R. CIV. P. 42(i): 
 (i) Attorney’s fees award. 
 (1) In awarding attorney fees, the court must first determine a lodestar figure by 
multiplying the number of hours reasonably worked times a reasonable hourly rate. The 
attorney fees award must be in the range of 25% to 400% of the lodestar figure. In making 
these determinations, the court must consider the factors specified in Rule 1.04(b), Tex. 
Disciplinary R. Prof. Conduct. 
 (2) If any portion of the benefits recovered are in the form of coupons or other noncash 
common benefits, the attorney fees awarded in the action must be in cash and noncash 
amounts in the same proportion as the recovery of the class. 
 22. 14 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2):  
 (2) Required state of mind 
 In any private action arising under this chapter in which the plaintiff may recover money 
damages only on proof that the defendant acted with a particular state of mind, the complaint 
shall, with respect to each act or omission alleged to violate this chapter, state with 
particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required 
state of mind. 
 23. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1)(A). 
 24. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1)(C); see Advisory Committee notes. 
 25. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f). 
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CAFA deals with the perceived problem of plaintiffs’ counsel selecting 
unmeritorious cases by limiting the forum for those suits.26 It provides 
original jurisdiction to federal courts where there is more than $5,000,000 
in dispute and there is minimal diversity.27 Federal district courts may 
decline to exercise jurisdiction when the proceeding involves more state-
oriented, rather than national, claims.28 The goal is to channel class actions 
to federal courts which have not been as hospitable to Rule 23 certification 
and to prevent these cases from re-emerging as state class actions. 
The U.S. Supreme Court and courts of appeals have been skeptical of 
Rule 23 being used either for trial or settlement of personal injury cases.29 
Notwithstanding the asbestos,30 IUD,31 pharmaceutical,32 and other 
personal injury mass torts33 that were certified as classes at the end of the 
last century, the more recent jurisprudence in federal courts has not 
favored certification.34 Some state supreme courts have limited the 
applicability of class actions based upon predominance and choice of law 
rationales.35 Alabama allows a stay of discovery on the merits of a lawsuit 
pending a “rigorous analysis” on class certification.36 
5. Increased Federal Judicial Role. All of the recent reforms share a 
propensity to increase the role of federal courts in handling class actions. 
The theme of the PSLRA, SLUSA, CAFA, Rule 23, and Supreme Court 
decisions seems to be that federal judges should be gatekeepers to insure 
that cases are not certified as classes unless the cases meet certain 
prerequisites. The SLUSA, for example, explicitly supplemented the 
PLSRA to allow for removal of cases that sound like a securities law 
claim.37 This approach is driven in part by the problems defendants face in 
defending certified class actions, even if a lawsuit is subsequently 
determined to be unmeritorious. 
 26. 28 U.S.C. § 1711 (providing for original jurisdiction in federal district courts). 
 27. Id. at § 1711(a)(2). 
 28. Id. at § 1711(3). 
 29. See, e.g., Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 US. 591 (1997); Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 
527 U.S. 815 (1999). 
 30. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Raymark Indus., 831 F.2d 550 (5th Cir. 1987). 
 31. See, e.g., In re A. H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d 709 (4th Cir. 1989). 
 32. See, e.g., In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig., Nos. 1203, 99-20953, 2000 WL 1222042, at 
*32–40 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 28, 2000). 
 33. In re Silicone Gel Breast Implants Prods. Liab. Litig., 174 F. Supp. 2d 1242 (N.D. Ala. 
2001), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, United States v. Baxter Int’l, Inc. 345 F.3d 866 (11th Cir. 2003), 
cert. denied, 542 U.S. 946 (2004). 
 34. See, e.g., In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995). 
 35. Sw. Ref. Co. v. Bernal, 22 S.W.3d 425 (Tex. 2000). 
 36. ALA. CODE §§ 6-5-641(c) and (e) (LexisNexis Supp. 2004). 
 37. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77p(b). 
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A similar thrust exists with the selection of counsel, the fairness of 
settlement, and the award of attorney fees. Not only are judges to 
scrutinize these issues carefully, but they must also justify their decisions 
which are subject to appellate review.38 
UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES 
Be careful what you ask for because you might get it. These reform 
themes are now confronting the innovativeness of the plaintiffs’ bar and 
the future is filled with unforeseeable ramifications. Although the authors 
of reform have the advantage of defining the rules of the game, there is the 
related disadvantage of being a stationary target. The range of options to 
circumvent stable rules is continuously subjected to the inventiveness of 
counsel. Given sufficient financial incentives or a narrowing range of 
alternative litigation opportunities, the marketplace of litigation has been 
fertile ground for unpredictable outcomes. By preferring plaintiffs under 
the PSLRA to be large financial entities,39 there are now extremely 
aggressive institutions with enormous political power leading cases rather 
than anonymous individual investors.40 At the same time, those 
sophisticated financial institutions seem to be selecting the same plaintiffs’ 
securities firms who were ubiquitous in the pre-PSLRA era.41 
The involvement of public officials, particularly state attorneys general, 
into the class action arena seems to be creating a new dynamic that may 
have seemingly perverse effects.42 This will particularly be true if state 
attorneys general follow the tobacco model of contracting out to private 
plaintiffs’ lawyers the task of seeking redress of public wrongs through the 
use of class action.43 
Class action defendants have always been schizophrenic about Rule 23. 
They generally are opposed to class certification, but once a case is 
certified, they prefer the ability of a class action to achieve finality. Facing 
large numbers of individual claims with the concomitant transaction costs 
presents a defendant with a dilemma. Resolving all the claims in a class 
 38. FED. R. CIV. P. 23. 
 39. 15 U.S.C. § 77z-1(a)(3). 
 40. Gretchen Morgenson, Morgan Accord Over WorldCom Costs $2 Billion, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 
17, 2005, at A1. 
 41. See Stephen J. Choi, Jill E. Fisch, & A.C. Pritchard, Do Institutions Matter? The Impact of 
the Lead Plaintiff Provision of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 869 
(2005). 
 42. Stephen Labaton & Steve Lohr, U.S. and Some States Split on Microsoft, Risking New Delay, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2001, at C1. 
 43. Peter Katel, Spoils of Law, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 8, 1997, at 53. 
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action may be a far more attractive outcome from a business perspective 
than proceeding with the traditional litigation model. Eliminating the 
availability of class actions for global resolution may narrow a defendant’s 
exit strategies in unanticipated ways.44 
Probably the most interesting ramifications of these themes in class 
action reform relate to the judiciary. The assumption underlying CAFA, 
for example, is that the current lack of hospitality for class actions in 
federal courts will be a persistent phenomenon. If federal courts are the 
only game in town because state courts have been removed from the class 
action arena, will we find compelling facts creating more hospitality? The 
pressure of more work for federal courts could lead to procedures that 
were not envisioned by the CAFA authors. 
Another area of judicial uncertainty arises from the tendency of the 
Supreme Court to favor principle over pragmatism in its class action 
decisions.45 There is a proud tradition of bottom-up reform in the judicial 
process where trial courts perceive a need to resolve cases even if it means 
using innovative procedures. Oftentimes appellate courts are initially 
resistant to variations in traditional approaches, but when the pressure to 
resolve cases intensifies, new procedures can evolve.46 Appellate courts 
always face the perfect being the enemy of the good. One argument to 
explain the recent phenomenon of the “vanishing” federal trial is that the 
federal courts are producing a product that litigators no longer want to 
buy.47 The war of attrition strategy pursued by counsel in most major 
litigation is in part a result of the federal courts’ requirements for 
expensive dispute resolution. Will the pressures for more economical and 
streamlined litigation lead to new judicial procedures? Or will the need for 
legal redress manifest itself in unpredicted manners? 
CONCLUSION 
Recent reforms in class actions have been directed at common themes 
of public transparency, client control and attorney selection, attorney fees, 
suit selection, and an increased judicial role. Reactions to those reforms 
are beginning to emerge, some of them in unexpected fashions. The 
 44. See generally Francis E. McGovern, Settlement of Mass Torts in a Federal System, 36 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 871 (2001); Francis E. McGovern, The Defensive Use of Federal Class Actions in 
Mass Torts, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 595 (1997). 
 45. Id. 
 46. Jenkins v. Raymark Indus., 831 F.2d 550 (5th Cir. 1987). 
 47. See generally Symposium, The Civil Trial: Adaptation and Alternatives, 57 STAN. L. REV. 
1255 (2005) (entire issue). 
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innovativeness of the plaintiffs’ bar in circumventing stationary statutory 
targets, and the reactions of the federal judiciary to its new responsibilities 
and duties will continue to be fertile ground for the ebb and flow in class 
action procedure. 
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